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In the HARVARD LAW REVIEW for last November, Justice Holmes
pays brief, genial, but illuminating respects to "Natural Law." .He
thinks that in all men there exists an ingenuous and naive demand for
a superlative---"so much so that the poor devil who has no other way
of reaching it attains it by getting drunk." In this world of rela-
tivities the soul strains after finalities and absolutes. "It seems to me
that this demand is at the bottom of the philosopher's effort to prove
that truth is absolute and of the jurist's search for criteria of universal
validity which he collects under the head of natural law." It is evi-
dent enough that the Justice takes but Jimited stock in natural law as
represented by such "collections." The implication of his writings is
that law is evolutionary. In any case, this utterance of his affords an
occasion for asserting and maintaining that contention.
The most accessible point on which to join issue is the term "natural."
This term is under suspicion, and deserves it. About it has collected
a clutter of intellectual rubbish, heaped up by the winds of doctrine
and rooted at, from time to time, by the vagrant dialectician. We men
have stock ways of concealing ignorance and of dissimulating indolence
and prepossession. We have elaborate and pretentious modes of
saying: "I do not know," or even, "I do not care to know." "It is
easy," writes Darwin,' "to hide our ignorance under such expressions
as the 'plan of creation,' 'unity of design,' etc., and to think that we
give an explanation when we only restate a fact." Camouflage is
nothing new in the intellectual world, as is sufficiently indicated by the
avidity with which the term has been seized upon as a metaphor. What
is under the painted cheese-cloth this time?
In earlier and simpler ages men knew little and frankly referred the
explanation of what they could not account for on the basis of con-
crete experience, to the world of spirits which, as they conceived of it,
surrounded and permeated their existence. In so doing they regularly
sought for an agent rather than a cause. The fellow-tribesman died of
some disease; and the survivors asked forthwith, not what killed him,
but who had done him to death-by witchcraft. How did the world
and man come into being? Unkulunkulu made them. How did man
acquire fire? Prometheus stole it from heaven. Where did the laws
come from? Minos "gave" them.
'Origin of Species, 497.
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This tendency to seek a supernatural agency for all phenomena not
explicable with the aid of present or accumulated experience, under the
tests of reality current in ordinary life, is represented by copious sur-
vivals among more sophisticated peoples. Among these is the habit of
personalizing abstractions. Says Darwin,2 again: "It is difficult to
avoid personifying the word Nature"; and he goes on to state that by
nature he means "only the aggregate action and product of many
natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us."
Manifestly this is not what Aquinas meant when he made proclamation
that "by the law of Nature all things are common," thence deriving
the sentiment that it was avarice which brought in the property-con-
ception of mine and thine. What he had in mind was theological
dogma, and his Nature was the Creator.
Scientifically speaking, the ascription of phenomena to the arbi-
trary action of a personal Power is only a grandiose way of saying:
"I do not know." Sooner or later we men have to say that, as we face
the encircling dark; but the only way we have got as far as we have
is by resolutely refusing to say it till we have to-and then by saying it
squarely and without self-deceiving circumlocution.
It is the tendency of ignorance and of intellectual torpidity to throw
itself forthwith upon the "higher causes," or the absolute, or the uni-
versal, or revelation-why search painfully for the special key if you
have the pass-key?-and thence secure a major premise, out of which,
then, anything and everything can be readily deduced. "You can get
out of a major premise," says Sumner, "everything you have put into
it." This habitude, taken together with the personalization of the
higher causes, or the absolute, has been the mode of primitive thought
from the outset up to, and including, the present. It is easier. It is
the line of least resistance. It is our human way to be engrossed in the
definite and immediate things amidst which we live; "and then we
think with less strain if we think in terms of persons. In fact, the
race has always personalized the less tangible and more abstract things,
for by such means it has been possible to tie up floating and evasive
conceptions so that they can be found again and dealt with. The vast
impersonalities that control our destiny-Nature, Chance, God-are
rendered into terms that men are more used to handle. The de-person-
alization of what has been long personalized has demanded a tedious
process of mental discipline and development."3
We have slowly and laboriously extended the range of the "lower
causes" to explain what was formerly referred forthwith to Zeus, or
Fortuna, or to some Law-Giver. We have progressively eliminated
the explanatory subterfuge; we have discarded the easy excuse and
2 Origin of Species, 75.
'Keller, Through War to Peace, 2.
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have girded ourselves to the arduous performance. But there are
many modern men who yet resist the process; it is of such that Darwin
4
speaks when he refers to "one whose disposition leads him to attach
more weight to. unexplained difficulties than to the explanation of a
certain number of facts"-that is, one who, in the face of difficulties,
races incontinently back to the refuge of his chosen universal. Such
an one refuses to remove an issue from the domain of Natural law
into that of natural law.
An attenuated and a paler survival of this same attitude is to be
found in the rooted persuasion that, even among the "lower causes,"
there is some absolute or universal to be detected. Many a man who
rejects "Natural" in the sense of supernatural, yet readily uses "nat-
ural" to cover the unknown. Why is the right arm generally stronger
than the left? It is "naturally" so. But that is no answer. It is an
evasion; it is no more than equivalent to the childish retort: "Because
it is." And then, when "natural"--or "instinctive" (another bit of
cheese-cloth)-is felt to be insufficiently protective, there will be a
little hedging and a reference to "second nature." It is a sop, auto-
matically and unconsciously thrown to vanity, to employ an expression
that sounds as if it meant and explained something, and that darkly
suggests vistas of profound reflection, rather than to admit ignorance
baldly and without adornment.
Push the man who says that it is natural to be right-handed, and very
likely he will abandon his subterfuge and be candid about his igno-
rance; or he will rake about in his mental outfit and fry to construct
some rudimentary theory. Either alternative is hopeful: the one ethi-
cally, the other scientifically. Theories can be corrected. This is the
way we have got our science: we have corrected astrology into astron-
omy, alchemy into chemistry, magic into medicine. Push the man
who talks about natural law, and he will either admit his ignorance,
fly to the "Natural" of which his "natural" is but a thin and blood-
less survival, or set to work to dig out some real evidence. As tem-
perament and previous experience determine, he will show a block-
head's indifference, the antique recourse to unverified authority, or the
modern procedure of the positivist. If he adopts the last course, he is
on the way to the truth of the matter, for he will shortly find that
"natural law" exists about as little as "natural rights," or any other of
those philosophical figments that have not been checked up with
realities. He will soon come to see that law, like all other living things,
is evolutionary, persisting only as it secures adjustment to a changing
environment. Then he will change his tune about absolutes, finalities,
and universals.
The origin of species was by creation, or it was by evolution.
'Origin of Species, 497.
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Species are either permanent and invariable, or they are not. Nobody
who is informed has any doubt any longer on this issue. Codes of law
are either a created, permanent, and invariable product; or they are
evolutionary, relative, changing, and adaptive. There is no third possi-
bility. If law is evolutionary, then its course will show, as that of
organic nature shows, a series of forms developing out of forms, in a
connected series, with survival of the fitter, in adjustment to environ-
ment. Evolution is a law of all life, social as well as organic.
No man can execute a tour de force, like that of Darwin, and con-
fine resultant intellectual clarification, even if he wills, within the range
of phenomena immediately under observation while the theory was
being constructed. Ranges of knowledge are sufficiently akin to be
subject to ready mutual infection. In the middle of the last century
evolution was in the air, and Spencer was discovering it in the social-
or, as he called it, the superorganic-realm while Darwin and Huxley
were demonstrating its presence in the organic. No man who has
seriously followed Spencer's sociological writings, however much he
may dissent from Spencer's specific contentions, has any excuse for not
knowing that law, along with all other social forms and institutions, is
a matter of growth from unpromising beginnings, through illimitable
time-time that stretches not only from the present back to the begin-
nings, but also from the present forward to the last days of the last
human society that shall inhabit this planet.
One may accept this general contention on general principles, how-
ever, and still feel that it does not get him anywhere. Or he may be
disposed to reject the contention in default of evidence of a concrete
nature. All homage to either objector: to the first, who insists that
any acceptable theory about law, or any other institution of society, shall
work out into something tangible and actual-shall be another tool in
his kit; and to the second, who refuses to accept what looks like a
plausible philosophical conclusion, arrived at by general reasoning,
supported by analogy, but not established by specific cases. Both styles
of objection are valid against much of Spencer's work, which was so
largely philosophical and speculative as to have incurred the distrust of
his scientific contemporaries, notably Darwin and Huxley. Spencer
was so plausible that Darwin used to be impatient with himself because
he could not consent to conclusions so smoothly arrived at; while the
quicker and wittier Huxley used to plague the solemn philosopher over
his "diabolical dialectics."
So deeply did Spencer impress his stamp upon the social thought of
his age that to most students of social phenomena evolution means
Spencerian evolution. It is something of a novelty to discard his
formulas and to seek the sturdier supports afforded by Darwin and the
Darwinians. But let us set aside those all-inclusive, and therefore
tenuous and unscientific propositions that Spencer revels in-about the
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passage of matter "from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a
definite, coherent heterogeneity" 5-- and inquire, more prosaically,
whether human institutions, and, among them, law, show adjustment to
life-conditions by way of the stock Darwinian factors of variation,
selection, and transmission. For the upshot of evolution, in the Dar-
winian sense, is adaptation to environment.
Judge Gager, in a forceful and penetrating review of one number of
the "Evolution of Law Series," wonders "whether the use of the term
'evolution' as applied to the history and transformation of law is not
vague and merely metaphorical or actually misleading." He thinks it
probable "that law as law has no 'tendency' whatever, any more than
a quantity- of bricks has a tendency to become a house. Strictly it
never changes, but it is changed from without; it does not develop,
but it is developed." And he writes, later on: "The world would place
upon its loftiest pinnacle of fame that person who, to-day, with the
help of principles derived from the so-called evolution of law, would
be able to forecast the events in the field of law within the next few
years."
Taking these objections in reverse order-it is doubtless true that
the test of a scientific discipline is prediction, and that accurate fore-
casting has been attained where the nature of the scientific material,
say, in chemistry, has allowed of it. But the pinnacle of which Judge
Gager speaks is likely to remain unoccupied for some time yet. Such
accuracy in prediction has never been possible in the social sciences,
and very likely never will be. There are too many variables to take
into the equation. The best that can be hoped for, at least for the
present, is a high degree of probability. That the evolutionist in the
social field cannot forecast events accurately, in the legal range or else-
where, is nothing against him whereby he should not be accorded a
right to existence. If he can show an orderly development in the
past and present, he has done all he professes to do; and he has accom-
plished something that has waited ages for its realization.
As for law showing no "tendency," that also is true. But neither
does the horse's hoof or the camel's foot show a tendency. Each
exhibits an adjustment or adaptation to life-conditions; and that is
precisely what any legal enactment shows, or it becomes dead-letter
and nil. Each of these things is a product of the evolutionary process;
it has nothing to do with the process itself. Such a product is also
the pile of bricks. The place to look for a revelation of the tendency
'Spencer's formula of evolution (First Principles, sec. 145) states: "Evolution
is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which
the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,
coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a
parallel transformation."
' (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOuRAL 617, ff.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
or trend of evolution is in a long series of successive adjustments; no
single case, or stratum of cases, can show it. The process is too slow,
massive, and cosmic to be observed under limitation of observation in
space or time. Each of us stands upon a geographical great circle,
but we cannot, from local observation, plot its tren&
It is much to be feared that those who seek a trend or tendency in
evolution are, perhaps unwittingly, looking for something that they can
call progress or betterment. But such terms are out of place in pure
science. They imply a seJected view-point. Is the horse's hoof an
improvement upon the camel's foot? It all depends upon the nature of
the environment. Each is an adequate adjustment to the conditions
encountered, and there is no more to be said. Which is better, frontier-
justice or the sort we ourselves are used to? Let the inquirer read
Wister's Virginian over again, and note the maladjustment of the
standards of Bennington, Vermont, to the conditions of the West.
The first of judge Gager's exceptions can be met only by a more
extended demonstration, in the course of which, even if the suspicion
of vagueness, etc., may not be dispelled, it is hoped that further light
will be shed upon his other thoroughly reasonable and apt criticisms.
It is clear enough that, to get any results at all respecting evolution,
there is need of a long perspective. It is also evident that distance
and detachment, so necessary to the dispassionate study of any aspects
of human society, can be most securely attained by fixing attention
upon the members of the evolutionary geries that are remoter from us,
and from our interests and biases. Presumably it is agreed by any
who have given scientific attention to the matter that laws come out of
precedents, and that precedents are simply a selection from custom.
If it is not so agreed at the outset, perhaps it will be when we have
looked into the case further. Anyhow I want to begin with custom.
Anyone who sees that all human institutions whatsoever have risen out
of custom will observe that we are thus dealing with the remoter mem-
bers of a series certain of whose later phases are now called law; and
those who are not ready to subscribe to this contention may, perhaps,
allow me to begin, to them arbitrarily or inconsequently, where I do.
"Custom" is a floating and vague conception, difficult to handle with
certitude, prone to assume protean form and evade the hand. It takes
mental grasp to reduce such a conception to usable form. This was,
some of us think, the supreme service of Professor Sumner to the
social sciences; for he analyzed the elusive thing and developed a
terminology that fixed it within a framework, so to speak, so that it
could be found, handled, laid aside, and returned to with security.
Custom, in its most unformed phase, he called folkways. Folkways
that had been generally approved as conducive to welfare he denomi-
nated mores. But, since the most salient of the folkways are always
conceived as making for the welfare of those who practice them, mores
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has become the more current and inclusive term. The mores, as Sum-
ner defined them,7 are "the popular usages and traditions, when they
include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare, and
when they exert a coercion on the individual to conform to them,
although they are not cobrdinated by any authority." I shall not
attempt to reproduce here, or even to digest, the mass of data and sug-
gestive comment given by Sumner in the course of his analysis of the
mores. I wish now to show reason for regarding the mores as an
evolutionary product-a position that Sumner did not take.
Plants and animals are adapted to environment through structural
modification. They thus show a diversity of characteristics on which
naturalists classify them into species, genera, and wider categories. To
a limited extent, man is similarly classifiable; but, although he is the
most widespread of organic beings, over all types of earthly environ-
ment, the physical differences which he exhibits in adjustment to these
differing sets of life-conditions are relatively trifling. Classification
of homo into different species is the most that can be hoped for; there
are no differences great enough to be generic, and the several races are
most commonly regarded as mere varieties, so nearly alike are they.
Man's diversities of structural modification are by no means sufficient to
secure his adjustment to the extremes of environment in which he lives.
His typical mode of adjustment is mental. But this mode is not
measurable, or even observable, except through its products. These
products run all the way from the stone ax to the trip-hammer, includ-
ing all material civilization, even to a pile of bricks. They also include
modes of action that represent efficiency in coping with the conditions
of life. They cover systems and economies and organizations that
develop in the struggle for existence and the competition with fellow-
creatures. They therefore embrace, in short, all the folkways and
mores, and whatever develops out of these in the way of more definite
and settled social forms. Then the mores are as much evolutionary
products as are the horse's hoof and the camel's foot aforementioned.
They are equally adjustments to life-conditions, possessing survival-
value and thus characteristic of the fitter societies. It is by adjust-
ments in its mores that a human group adapts itself to environment;
the slower method by way of structural change is superseded by the
swifter action of a specialized organ of adjustment, the mind.
Adjustment may be mental without being deliberate, purposeful,
rational, or even conscious. Folkways are empirical, not planful.
Those who practice them can seldom give rational excuse for so doing.
It is as if the society at large developed them. "It seems as if the
"Folkways, a Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Cus-
toms, Mores and Morals, iii. Sumner's conception is summarized to some
extent in Keller, Societal Evolutions, ch. I, and, more popularly, in Througi;
War to Peace, ch. V.
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crowd had a mystic power in it greater than the sum of the powers of
its members. It is sufficient, however, to explain this, to notice that
there is a cobperation and constant suggestion which is highly produc-
tive when it operates in a crowd, because it draws out latent power, con-
centrates what would otherwise be scattered, verifies and corrects what
has been taken up, eliminates error, and constructs by combination."
All this is a highly unconscious and unplanned procedure, not alone
among primitives, but among us all. "Thinking and understanding are
too hard work. If any one wants to blame the masses let him turn to
his own case. He will find that he thinks about and understands only
his own intellectual pursuit. He could not give the effort to every
other department of knowledge. In other matters he is one of the
masses and does as they do. He uses routine, set formulae, current
phrases, caught up from magazines and newspapers of the better
class."" Most of mankind has always lived almost wholly in the mores,
and the most emancipated and sophisticated have lived in them most
of their time.
Mores fall into categories as they surround the nucleus of a major
social interest; and out of these categories, when they have shaken
down into more or less typical form, come the institutions. One of
the cardinal facts of human life is sex. It is an inevitable condition
of the life of homo that the fact of bisexuality must be encountered.
The sexes show basic and inalterable physical and mental differences,
which are reflected in sex codes of mores. But now the sexes must
live in some sort of association. Here is a need requiring many per-
sonal and social adjustments, which has been met by all thinkable
expedients. The question of how mating men and women shall live
together is one that touches not only the personal interests of the
protagonists, but also those of many other persons, including the
parents of both, their children, and the society at large. Titles to
property must be defined and secured, for otherwise there would be
confusion and disorder; legitimacy must be defined. The mores settle
all this, so that it is never a matter of dispute, but young men and
women grow up into an unconsciously developed system of conduct as
respects sex-conditions, than which they know no other. This accre-
tion of mores about this nucleus receives a name and designation; we
call it matrimony, and we do not hesitate to term it an institution.
And presently we have also the family-institution. The whole exhibit
is only a group of mores, a ganglion of custom, labelled for identifica-
tion, and then sub-labelled, according to its various emphases, as poly-
andry, polygyny, monogamy, patriarchate.
Another major interest is the environment of ghosts and spirits.
It is as actual to primitive people as any other form of life-condition.
'Sumner, Folkways, secs. 23, 54.
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The mores developed in response are sacrifice, prayer, magic, etc.,
which are labelled "religion"; and religion is an institution. The
interest of men is enlisted, once more, in the question of the relation
of a thing to a person, so that it belongs to him; and mores develop
that we label "property." The taboo is the institution-builder; it
chisels away at the raw block of custom, gradually shaping a figure
which at length seems to have had an origin in "nature."
All these accretions of practices and precedents tend to become
traditional, almost invariable, universal in a group, and highly impera-
tive. It is hard to fight against priority and prescription. Let now
the sanction of religion enforce precedent-and you always have the
authority of the dead behind the major exhibitions of the mores, among
simpler peoples-and you have ecclesiastical laws and canons. Let
the power of the State-itself a growth of mores engendered in
response to the vital social necessity of obedience, discipline, and
order-let this power back up the mores, and you have secular law.
Law is a sort of crystallization of the mores; it is a selection from
precedents of behavior.
But I am falling into evolutionary terminology, which needs justifi-
cation unless its use is to be conceived of as "vague and merely
metaphorical or actually misleading." It is freely admitted that its
employment has generally been open to all these charges. The "bio-
logic analogy" of Spencer has had argumentative weight ascribed to it
by his less judicious successors; and all the contemporary jabber about
"social heredity" and other terms borrowed from biology and evolu-
tion and applied incontinently and without discrimination to social
phenomena, has inspired every cautious thinker with a suspicion that
does him credit. Nasmyth 9 has even rushed to the succor of the
gentle-hearted Darwin and tried to clear him of the charge of being
the fors et origo of recent Teutonic savagery. For the German
pedants, with their typical heavy crudity, had laid hold of the analogy
between a society and an organism, and were working it out, with
the implied or alleged authority of Darwin, to lend theoretic sup-
port to their predatory tribal mores. The unfit must get out of the
way of the fit or take the consequences; and the Germans were the
fit by their own admission and demonstration. No account was taken
of the fact that fitness is not the same thing in social as in organic
life; or in the twentieth century as in the first. The readiness with
which German scientists abandoned their scientific method and cafidor
in the face of material opportunity confirms the distrust that some of
us, in the social sciences, at least, have long harbored as to the genu-
ineness of their devotion to truth, or even of their perception of it.
It looks as if they too really believed at bottom in the revelation to a
'Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory.
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chosen people by a tribal Gott, through his earthly, or unearthly,
representatives, of a "natural law" exalted high above mere mortal
examination or criticism.
The essence of evolution is adjustment to life-conditions. But
adjustment to changing conditions implies change. Change is secured,
in the organic range, by the element of variation. It is immaterial to
the process whether or not the variation is pronounced enough to be
called a mutation. The presence of variation in the mores, over space
and through time, is a matter of observation. Variation in the less
vital of the folkways, as for example, fashion, can be viewed from
day to day. The race is unreflectingly aware of the action of this
factor, as is shown by those repositories of folk-wisdom, proverbs.
"Other times, other manners." Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur
in illis. "When in Rome, do as tlie Romans do." Laudations temporis
acti or projected reforms witness to an acceptation of the possibility
of change in human codes of conduct. To cite evidence of such varia-
tion looks like elaboration of the obvious; but candor obliges one to
admit that the obvious is oftener left out of account than the recondite.
We have, however, the fact of variation in custom. There is no
analogy here; the phenomenon is present in the social realm entirely
independently of its presence elsewhere. And is it necessary to be
specific in the matter of law? "No," answers the objector, "we know
that the details of legal codes have changed; but there is an element of
permanency, too. How do you account for that?" We do account
for that also, and presently; but we accept for the moment the admis-
sion of change. In any case, then, not all law is "natural" or revealed;
Lycurgus did not provide for limited liability nor Solon for the regula-
tion of wireless. Something is gained by an admission even so trifling.
Not all variations of law persist, even nowadays. For instance,
regulations about sterilization of hopeless idiots and criminals have
not amounted to much, and seem nearly if not quite dead-letter. It is
plain that all the laws about slaves saw their passing when there were
no more slaves; or, to widen again into the broader field of custom,
that mores about slaves and their rights and duties passed away with
the change of human status. The mores of chivalry exist only in
histories and in travesties such as Don Quixote. The elaborate duel-
ing-code is all but extinct. If, then, some mores and codes have been
discarded, there has been a selection. Much of this selection (the
term is used in the evolutionary negative sense) has been automatic
and unconscious, not rational or planned. Often it has been an unfore-
seen consequence of action initiated in a quite different range of opera-
tiorr. Slavery never prospered, though it was tried, in New England;
but those who gave it up there did not hate the system or morally
reprobate it. It simply did not pay where there was an adequate
supply of acclimatized free labor. Variation provides for unconscious
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experimentation; certain variations are not apt to the situation and
are selected away as practically inexpedient.
But variation is in all directions, constituting, in earlier epochs, a
sort of undirected and empirical, groping about for satisfaction or sur-
cease in the face of a compelling need. And when the inexpedient' has
been discarded, the less inexpedient, or the fitter and more expedient,
is left to hold the field. There is a survival of the fitter form in the
social range as there is such survival in the organic. There is no
vagueness of analogy here; it is an identity-the same process of
elimination manifested in another and characteristic realm of phenom-
ena. The only dispute that seems reasonable here is as to how far the
process of selection is rational and planful, and how far automatic and
unconscious. I believe it to be typically the latter;1° but the point
does not need to be pressed in the present connection. The issue here
is simply as to the presence and activity of the factor of selection.
The constant variation of the mores renders them of unequal sur-
vival-value. But to test this matter there must be a conflict or com-
petition between them, as put into practice. No theorizing or prophecy
will settle this question; for even the best-planned measures, not to
mention those that are automatically hit upon, or those that make the
strongest emotional appeal, even to the highminded, often fail in
actuality where they show nothing but promise prior to their applica-
tion. The test comes in the result of collision between the exponents
of rival codes of behavior. This is most readily seen in war, but
appears also in the case of various peaceful industrial and other social
competitions. For example, the late War was, at last analysis, the
confrontation of the exponents of two irreconcilable codes of national
conduct; and the result has been, we hope, a selection out of existence
of the challenging code. The Civil War eliminated slavery; and from
the French and American Revolutions we date an era of new mores,
political and social. Peaceful collisions of the adherents, of diverse
policies occur at most elections. Diverse interpretations of law,
evoked by needs of adjustment to changed life-conditions, come to
discrimination before every court; and not infrequently the accepted
interpretation does away in actuality with the original intention of the
law, thus amounting to a selection on the criterion of applicability to
altered conditions.
If the fact of variation in the mores be granted, whereby some of
them enjoy, under selection, a survival-value over others, leading to
their persistence, then the mores thus approved under test as superior
in fitness become subject to the action of tradition. This is the factor
in the social field that corresponds to heredity in the organic. It
exhibits, not through analogy but in its actual essence, the same typical
See Keller, Societal Evolution, chs. IV, V; Through War to Peace, chs. I-IV.
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quality of conservatism. Where variation engenders the new, it pre-
serves the od; and the same eternal oscillation under the forces of
change and those of stabilization takes place in the one range as in
the other. But tradition possesses, as it were, a certain supporting
handicap of inertia. In general, the burden of proof falls upon the
innovation. To any evolutionist it is well that this is so, for the very
fact that that inertia exists shows that it has had its utility in the course
of things. Most innovations break against its solid and stolid bulk;
and if one makes a breach it must have had its qualities in order to do
so. It is possible to be too stable, but the dangers of stability are
perhaps to be preferred to those of mutability. Crystallization versus
chaos: the choice of extremes is the typical human choice of ills,-but
very likely the via media is not always along the mathematical mean.
The only characteristics that tradition can carry forward are those
which have, at some time, survived the conflict by their superior fitness
to environment at that time. For the mores, the environment has been
the sum of life-conditions at the time. If one society of human beings
got on better than others, and increased in numbers and power, because
its code of behavior was better suited to life-conditions-by reason of a
superiority in industrial co6peration, or in its marital arrangements, or
in its regulative system, or in its religion-its code succeeded with it
and gained extension and intensity. The tradition of success laid hold
of it and endowed it with the authority of the illustrious dead who had
sponsored it. It became fixed and immutable, to the eyes of those
who received it. If life-conditions had not been subject to change
thereafter, this would have been well; and we should doubtless all be
practicing the successful code ever since. But in view of the perennial
change in life-conditions, all we can be sure of about tradition is that
what it transmits to us must have been an adequate adjustment at one
time and under its conditions. The only way in which a traditional
social order can be accepted as infallible, and applied to much later
conditions, is by subjecting it to such interpretation as to deceive our-
selves.as to its real nature and meaning. Such interpretation is neces-
sary in order, for example, to fit the prescriptions connected with the
mores of the ancient Hebrews to the life of contemporary America.
By the action of variation, selection, and tradition, then, the mores,
which are the external projection of mental action on life-conditions,
show adaptation to those life-conditions, and are evolutionary. For
the essence of evolution is such adaptation. Cases of adjustment of
codes to types of physical environment abound throughout ethnography
and are particularly marked in the life of frontier-societies, where the
code of the settlers almost unconsciously comes to approach, in many
respects, that of the natives. But even the modern great city has a
code of its own, new to the world, which it is developing all the time as
material life-conditions become more complex; and which is currently
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enough set in contrast with the rural code. But the life-conditions of
a society are by no means all of a physical or material quality; they
include neighboring societies, and, as distance has been annihilated by
progress in the arts, almost all human societies have become neighbors
to one another. Thus the adjustments in the mores must needs
become ever more delicate and subtle, with ever increasing prospects
of maladjustment, consequent pain and discomfort, selection, and read-
justment. The fact that the modern case is so complex forms a reason
why it is better to come at the whole matter from a study of the simpler
and more primitive forms.
What is said of the mores in general applies a fortiori to law.
Mores are the society's traditional ways of acting in the presence of
interest. But now one of the major interests of any society is that
there shall be cohesion, order, discipline, and coaperation within.
Otherwise it is subject to aggression from without. The extreme case
is that of war, when internal regulation reaches its acme of extension
and severity. What is a crime in war-times is perhaps not even a mis-
demeanor in peace. In that sense, war represents a reversion to the
crudities of the primal regulative system, with its frequent death-penal-
ties for what are to us trivial offenses, its undeveloped apparatus of
courts, advocates, etc. Here, in any case, is shown an insistence, under
special stress, upon the regulative system that governs conduct in the
interest of society's self-preservation.
Excluding war from the general case, it is clear that any society
at any time must show discipline and order in the conduct of its mem-
bers, if it is to persist under an unintermittent competition. For these
qualities have survival-value in them. Only under the protection of
extreme isolation, which minimizes the competition, may the socially or
the organically obsolete last on. The mores take care of the more
scattered and intimate questions of conduct. There is an extensive field
where law does not enter at all, as, for instance, that of the domestic
arcana. The essence of marriage is the personal, not the legal, rela-
tion. Man and wife have to live together in adjustments, involving
good-breeding, self-sacrifice, etc., which the law cannot touch. All
such intimate relationships are matters of the mores. But certain more
external cases, and classes of cases, enter more visibly and tangibly
into the arena of public accessibility and regulation; and these become
public precedents.
There is, at first, no distinction between the personal and the public
(if these two classes of cases may be roughly so termed) or between
mores and law. It is themis in Homer for a child to kiss his father;
but yet the king is charged with upholding the themistes, and does it
as an executive officer. Naturally, though, he does not enforce
caresses between parent and child. That the law is at first mere pre-
cedent is strikingly illustrated in the judgment-scene wrought on the
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shield of Achilles: there are a number of elders there; they all hear
the case and each then speaks the precedent as he sees it. That is, he
applies the current code whose tradition he, as an elder, is supposed
to know best, to the specific circumstance. The audience applauds or
not; and in the midst lie two pieces of gold, to be given to the judge
who speaks the precedent straightest."'
Precedents touching salient lines of conduct are presently codified
in some fashion: in formulas, or verses, or, at length, on "tablets."
This was long ago; but the very first codifications must have been pre-
ceded by an unreckonable period of test in usage. No one knows or
can know their origins, except as he can infer it from what we can
know of their subsequent course. Because they are so old they look to
be inevitable and "natural." And so they are currently referred to
some mythical, supernatural source-they were "given" on Tables
amidst terrific exhibitions of supernatural potency. Further, if we
examine such codifications, we find them pretty much alike; and that
strengthens the impression that they are somehow inevitable, and there-
fore "natural." But human societies are nearly enough alike to be
obliged, as a condition of self-preservation, to taboo practices that
might be termed anti-social. Such taboos might be thought to be
the result of acculturation (contagion, borrowing) if any possible
agency of communication could be discovered or even imagined
between remote parts of the earth in primitive ages. The better
explanation of concurrences is that they are parallelisms-taboos that
have sprung up under similar conditions as the only adequate response
to them.
The taboo: Thou shalt not kill (thy fellow-tribesman) represents
the very essence of social necessity, if internal cohesion and order are
to be maintained; and Thou shalt not steal (from a tribal brother)
establishes the right to property, thus excluding aggressions, reprisals,
and consequent chaos and disorganization. No society can long persist
in the competition without such inhibitions. Here are laws, then,
which have an eternal survival-value in them, so far as we can predict
in the light of the past, over space and through time; they are as good
in a modern society, as a conditio sine qua non, as they have been in the
most rudimentary group. It will be noted that they contemplate merely
the fellow-tribesmen-the members of the so-called "we-group," or
"in-group"-- for it is proper and praiseworthy to kill the alien, to rob
him, and to do to him all the other things which the code forbids
within the group. There is here no outcome of a yearning altruism;
the code is as un-moral from that point of view as are any of its
analogues in nature-the lion's claw, the viper's tooth, the law of the
pack.
"Iliad, XVIII, 497 ff.
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If we confine our attention to the elements common to all codes of
laws, over all earthly space and through such a vista of time as we can
span by recourse to our records, ethnographic and historic, and if we
are naive, we may readily conclude that this presence of similar or
even identical provisions in them supports the assumption that they
were put there by some Power. That is the way similarities in organic
nature used to be explained; it was "unity of design" that accounted
for all that-a pseudo-explanation restating the question. Or we may
say that part of law is "given," as species were given; and admit that
the rest was made by man, or, at least, not by "Nature," as formerly
it was admitted that varieties of animals and plants could be produced
under the operation of natural or "lower" agencies. Or we may dodge
the whole explanation by drawing a blank check on "natural law."
From the evolutionary standpoint, these similarities and identities
are simply variations that have persisted in the conflict because
endowed with lasting survival-value under any life-conditions of
society yet known to us. Tradition has passed them down unimpaired,
because they respond to a perennial necessity for the very self-preser-
vation of society. In that sense, they are natural and not Natural
law; but now we know what the "natural" means. We are on the
familiar scientific ground so strongly fortified by Lyell and others,
who championed the competency of forces which we see daily in opera-
tion about us to produce any and all results that come before our eyes.
In that position inheres intellectual liberation; and it is not recorded
that the possession of a long and orderly perspective has ever consti-
tuted a handicap when science has come to practical application.
